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Abstract
Since modern waterway networks are increasingly confronted with ageing assets, waterway 
renewal will increase in importance for western countries. Renewal can be regarded an 
impetus for realising integrated waterway networks that internalise externalities, which entails 
broad stakeholder involvement. This can be coordinated through different inter-organisational 
structures. Applying a transaction-cost perspective, we contribute to the assessment of 
effective governance arrangements for renewing waterway networks in such an integrated 
fashion. Our aim is to examine efficient inter-organisational structures for waterway renewal, 
as perceived by actors involved in a case study of the Dutch waterways. Our findings show 
that waterway renewal incorporates additional functionalities in terms of capacity (expansion 
or reduction), but not so much in terms of quality (combining transportation aims with spatial 
objectives such as ecology or regional development). Inter-organisational structures that 
address geographical interrelatedness and, hence, broader stakeholder involvement were 
associated with uncertain and time-consuming transactions, because of extensive negotiations 
regarding the alignment of conflicting interests and the crossing of geographical and 
administrative boundaries. Also, a change in interdependency from hierarchical towards 
contractual relationships was required, putting dominant actors (the national government) in 
an unfamiliar position in which they loosen their grip on infrastructure investments. 
Perceptions on transactions centre on sectoral aims and individual assets, whereas the actual 
transaction may be different if a perspective is taken that includes the greater waterway 
system, the wider spatial surroundings and a longer-term horizon. We conclude that short-
term, transportation objectives overrule longer-term, integrative objectives, which withholds 
strategic considerations required for aligning waterway interests.
Keywords: inland waterways; governance; stakeholder management; renewal; transaction 
cost economics; water management.
21. Introduction
Waterway networks are among the oldest as well as the most heavily used transportation 
systems. These networks are confronted with a major challenge: ageing assets. In the 
upcoming decades, vast investments are required to ensure the functionality (Gil & Beckman, 
2009; IMF, 2014; OECD 2014a). A major number of these assets, such as weirs, bridges and 
navigation locks, were built in the course of the 20th Century and currently reach their 
technical end-of-life. Consequently, these have to be renovated, replaced or renewed, which 
introduces the need to reconsider existing functionalities of the ageing assets in regard to both 
capacity (reduction or expansion) and quality (removing or including supplementary 
objectives related for instance to recreation, ecology or regional development). Initially 
designed for demands back then, the renewal and renovation of infrastructure assets is 
considered a window of opportunity to upgrade waterway systems to current and future 
demands (Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2010).
Translating this opportunity into economic terms, renewal can become an impetus for a better 
use of waterway resources. Since the late 1990s, integrated forms of waterway planning have 
been proposed in which infrastructure investments are aimed at not only sectoral 
transportation objectives, but also additional societal goals (Notteboom & Winkelmans, 2007; 
Hijdra et al., 2015). For instance, the creation of ecology-friendly river banks can benefit both 
the transportation and ecological function of a waterway. Accordingly, waterways have 
become multi-functional networks (Caris et al., 2014). There exists a wide array of integrated 
waterway planning approaches for coordinating renewal investments, which requires 
interactions between actors seen for instance in partnering, outsourcing or consulting 
stakeholders (Hijdra et al., 2014). Waterway renewal can therefore be considered an 
organisational question, in which infrastructure investments can contribute to aligning 
objectives and internalising externalities. In this conceptualisation, we consider redeveloping 
waterway networks as a form of voluntary collective action between different governmental 
bodies (and private actors) through the alignment or merger of interests that mutually profit 
both sides (Alexander, 1992). These actors are often highly dependent on each other, for 
example because of the location-specificity of waterway investments (Reve & Levitt, 1984). 
Shared waterway investments often involve long time horizons and extensive negotiations, in 
which actors cannot simply drop out as they will lose their investments made at particular 
sites. We can differentiate between transactions that include a broader geographical area and 
(hence) a wider array of stakeholders (aimed at internalising externalities), and transactions 
that centre purely on particular waterworks (leaving the externalities untouched). Recent 
research indicates that, in the face of waterway renewal, western planning practice is in search 
of suitable organisational forms (e.g., Malekpour et al., 2015; Roovers & Van Buuren, 2016; 
Willems et al., 2016).
For selecting the most efficient inter-organisational form, the transaction costs seem to be a 
determining factor. Transaction costs “can be seen as all the costs around a transaction other 
than the production costs” (Lai, 1994: 84). This includes, among other things, establishing 
relationships, gaining trust and enforcing agreements. Accordingly, “transaction cost 
economics explains how and why costs arise from the ways in which we organize to carry out 
3tasks” (Whittington, 2012: 272). In the domain of transport planning, this can be seen in, for 
example, research on the regulation of private involvement in infrastructure provisioning (Gil 
& Beckman, 2009; Soliño & Gago de Santos, 2010), the integration of services (Franc & Van 
Horst, 2010), and political processes surrounding transportation planning (Sager & Ravlum, 
2005). Transaction cost economics thus offers a lens on the effectiveness of governance 
arrangements. Until now, limited research has been conducted on coordination forms for 
integrated waterway approaches that stakeholders consider efficient for the organisation of 
waterway renewal. Transaction cost economics research typically uses expert opinions to 
estimate ex-ante the types of transaction costs that can be expected and, subsequently, to 
categorise governance approaches (McCann et al., 2005). Based on these perceived 
transaction costs, (modifications of) inter-organisational structures are proposed to improve 
the alignment of interests. In extremes, this can result in either a hierarchy in which one 
public government is responsible for all waterway-related interests, or a market situation in 
which waterway-related organisations voluntarily undertake exchanges to their mutual benefit 
(cf. Coase, 1960). In practice, often hybrid forms of inter-organisational co-operation are 
established, such as partnerships or joint ventures (Williamson, 1999a; 2000).
This article aims to explore (i) the transaction costs that key stakeholders associate with 
different approaches for waterway renewal in order to internalise externalities and (ii) its 
implications for waterway planning by identifying risks and institutional barriers. To this end, 
we focus specifically on a case study of the mature Dutch national inland waterway network, 
in which the oldest assets date back to as far as the beginning of the 20th century. This case 
study was selected on the basis of its high information level. First, the Netherlands can be 
considered an international frontrunner with regards to waterway management (OECD, 
2014b) and has started several large research programmes that explore innovative approaches 
for renewal. Second, waterways are of pivotal importance to the Netherlands, as a result of 
which a diverse set of renewal approaches can be expected. Our research question is: “What 
transaction costs do key stakeholders associate with possible inter-organisational structures 
that address Dutch national waterway system renewal?” This research will empirically 
contribute to the examination of feasible renewal approaches for waterway planning practice 
in the western world. Theoretically, applying transaction cost economics to the field of 
transportation helps to build understanding of why waterway investments for renewal are 
organised in specific ways.
The article is structured as follows: the second section discusses the theoretical framework in 
which transaction reasoning is explained further in relation to infrastructure investments. A 
framework is presented for analysing transaction dimensions to establish agreements for these 
investments. The third section introduces the case study and presents the methodology 
followed. The fourth, empirical section discusses and compares the transactions associated 
with three distinct approaches for waterway renewal. The article finishes with a conclusion.
2. A transaction-cost perspective on renewing waterway infrastructure
2.1. Co-creating societal value: towards integrative organisational structures
4As a result of, among other things, decreased public funding, a growing competition for land 
and increased environmental awareness, public governments increasingly feel the pressure to 
generate more societal value from their infrastructure investments in waterways (Notteboom 
& Winkelmans, 2007). A wider involvement of other stakeholders may imply that 
governments have to move away from silo-based, hierarchically operating entities towards 
new organisation models in which multiple public and private parties can work together to 
their mutual benefit (Hijdra et al., 2014). For realising mutual gains, these parties have to look 
for potential combinations of goals to overcome differing, and sometimes conflicting, 
organisational aims.
In the field of transport planning (including port and inland waterway planning), new inter-
organisational forms are being explored with broader stakeholder involvement, as seen, for 
instance, in increased public participation (Bickerstaff et al., 2002; Dooms et al., 2013), the 
development of integrated evaluation tools (Haezendonck, 2007; Woltjer et al., 2015) and 
integrated forms of transportation and land use (Hull, 2008; Caris et al., 2014). Although the 
functional interrelatedness is herewith acknowledged, parties often still operate in an 
institutionally fragmented context (Busscher et al., 2015; Heeres et al., 2016). As a result, the 
planning of waterways can be regarded a “complicated multi-scalar and multi-actor affair” 
(Romein et al., 2003: 207). This suggests that a wider geographical scope has to be taken into 
account and, consequently, more stakeholders need to be included – both those in the vicinity 
of the waterway and those further away.
Producing agreements between stakeholders for attracting greater societal value from 
waterway renewal investments can be seen as transactions and, consequently, will lead to 
parties making transaction costs (Williamson, 1975). Transaction costs are considered a 
determining factor in how stakeholder involvement is organised (Alexander, 1992; 
Whittington, 2012; Hijdra et al., 2014). Affected parties have to be brought together and 
produce agreements assigning property rights. This entails the establishment of relationships, 
which involves coordination, such as getting to know the other party, gaining trust, coming to 
an agreement and subsequently enforcing this (Buitelaar, 2003). Consequently, there are costs 
for carrying out a transaction in addition to the actual production costs, which can be 
expressed in monetary terms, but also in time, energy or efforts (Hazeu, 2000).
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is the academic discipline that explains how transactions 
are coordinated based on an economic theory of organisation (Williamson, 1975). Williamson 
(1975) posits that actors have a bounded rationality, so they will make decisions with 
incomplete information and asymmetrically distributed information (Parker & Hartley, 2003). 
TCE assumes that parties are self-interest seeking and aim for a lowering of transaction costs 
(Williamson, 2000). For that matter, they will behave opportunistically, strategically taking 
advantage of the information asymmetries. Contracts between actors can therefore never be 
optimal in practice. Although TCE is originally developed for understanding private firms, its 
concepts can also be applied to public bureaucracies (Moe, 1984; Alexander, 1992). 
According to Williamson (1999a: 319), “the absence of ideal markets in private sector 
transactions is precisely the opening through which TCE made its entry”. In other words, 
5private and public modes of organisation are often not “dramatically different” in practice 
(Moe, 1984: 760).
Analysing public infrastructure investments can benefit from insights of TCE, as these 
transactions contain a small number of involved parties and high asset specificity paves the 
way for opportunistic behaviour (cf. Williamson, 1975). Transactions that involve large, site-
specific investments in assets result in bilateral dependencies (Reve & Levitt, 1984). This 
generally accumulates in hierarchical forms of organisation, so the risks of opportunistic 
behaviour are reduced through direct ownership and control (Williamson, 1975; Franc & Van 
Horst, 2010). For example, governments that have co-financed investments in waterworks at a 
particular place cannot simply “bail out” their investment and move it to another site without 
making large costs: to a high degree, they are interdependent (Alexander, 1992).In addition to 
asset specificity, the factors uncertainty and timing are considered key variables in explaining 
the form of organisation (Williamson, 1975; Alexander, 2001; Parker & Hartley, 2003), albeit 
empirically sometimes less prominent (Macher & Richman, 2008). Uncertainty refers to the 
extent future conditions (such as transport demands and regional developments) and human 
behaviour can be predicted; timing refers to the frequency and duration of transactions (the 
number of times a transaction is recurring). In general, it can be expected that renewal 
investments wider in geographical scope are accompanied with more uncertainties and 
demand more frequent interactions. For example, with the inclusion of more remote 
stakeholders, geographical and administrative boundaries have to be crossed which may 
generate additional transaction costs related to legal and authority-related issues (Rietveld & 
Vickerman, 2003; Lai, 2007). 
The three dimensions of the transaction explain the established inter-organisational structures, 
also called “institutional arrangements” (Alexander, 1992; Williamson, 1999b; Buitelaar, 
2003). TCE positions hierarchy and market on a continuum as the two extreme forms of 
organising leading to either hierarchical or contractual relationships (Coase, 1960; 
Williamson, 1975). Non-asset specific transactions will result in a market situation, in which 
production is completely decentralised by means of individual contracts between 
organisations. In idiosyncratic (highly asset-specific) transactions, sustaining the relationship 
becomes a concern because of bilateral dependencies (Parker & Hartley, 2003). This often 
includes elements of a hierarchy, i.e. an organisation that internalises additional activities 
within its own boundaries. As Williamson (2000) has argued, in practice, often hybrid forms 
prevail that include elements from both hierarchy and market. Applying this to the waterways, 
Hijdra et al. (2014) demonstrate that a wide-ranging set of inter-organisational structures can 
be considered for infrastructure investments that account for broader stakeholder involvement.
Table 1 provides a framework with the three variables (asset specificity, uncertainty and 
timing) that allows for a relative comparison of the transaction costs for renewal approaches 
that are different in geographical scale and stakeholder inclusion. Following Lai (2005: 9), we 
will not “measure transaction costs in a cardinal sense”, but “along an ordinal scale by 
ranking transaction costs of different institutional orders”. As such, we aim to understand 
expert opinions on transaction costs for each variable which can serve as “rough borders of 
magnitude” for comparing renewal approaches (McCann et al., 2005: 532). In other words, 
6following Buitelaar (2003), we are not necessarily looking for the costs of a single best 
approach that addresses externalities, but rather at what the differences in perceived 
transaction costs are when comparing different approaches. Ultimately, this exploration 
allows for identifying promising and less promising waterway renewal approaches.
Explanation Examples for waterways
Asset specificity Degree of transaction-specific investments 
(related to location, technical equipment, 
and human capital)
Location-specific investments in 
infrastructure (weirs, locks) and plants 
(hydro-energy); financial investments in 
constructing equipment; knowledge of and 
experience in co-financing
Uncertainty The extent future conditions and human 
behaviour can be predicted
Awareness of plans by other governments; 
mapping socio-economic trends; getting 
familiar with strategies by other actors 
Timing Duration and frequency of transaction: one-
time versus recurring transactions
Consultation, disputes versus covenants, 
public-public partnerships 
Table 1: The three dimensions of a transaction (adapted from Williamson, 1999a; Alexander, 2001).
3. Methodology
3.1. Introduction to the case study
We use a case study of the Dutch inland waterway network as an example to identify 
promising approaches for waterway renewal. Qualitative case studies are a common 
methodology in transaction cost economics (Shelanski & Klein, 1995). Our case study is 
based on informed selection, because it can be expected to have a high level of information 
content contributing to in-depth insights on the relatively recent issue of waterway renewal 
(cf. Flyvbjerg, 2006). Not only does the Netherlands have a well-established and well-
documented waterway network (Lintsen, 2002), the country is also considered an 
international frontrunner in water management (OECD, 2014a). Moreover, the national 
government has made a €1.142 billion budget reservation until 2030 for waterway renewal 
investments (I&M, 2017). At the same time, it has started several exploratory studies to 
research novel waterway redevelopment approaches which include, for instance, innovative 
ideas for addressing current externalities in waterway configurations and incorporating a 
broader array of stakeholders (I&M, 2016; Van der Vlist et al., 2016).
The national inland waterway network is one of the oldest transportation systems in the 
Netherlands, with some assets dating back to as far as the early 1900s. The network consists 
of two main normalised natural rivers (Meuse, Rhine and their branches) and several man-
made canals (such as the Amsterdam-Rhine Canal). The institutional setting surrounding the 
physical network has changed considerably in the previous century (Willems et al., 2016). As 
the Dutch constitution prescribes a central role for the national government in developing and 
protecting land, waterway provision is essentially considered a public task in the Netherlands, 
in which the Ministry of Infrastructure & the Environment takes the lead using public funding 
arrangements. Its executive agency Rijkswaterstaat in particular has been a powerful actor in 
7Dutch inland waterway planning and management (Lintsen, 2002). This agency designed and 
constructed most of the current assets in the waterways over the course of the 20th century. 
Despite the full national control in realising waterway infrastructure, local consultation is 
required by law, which leads to extensive consultation rounds.
Section 2 described a move towards more integrated forms of waterway development in 
which the national government has started to work more closely with, for instance, regional 
governments and port authorities (Dooms et al., 2013). As Hijdra et al. (2015) argue, 
transportation aims are increasingly connected to regional spatial developments, resulting in 
infrastructure that is more embedded in the local context. Consequently, the national 
government has become more dependent on other stakeholders for improving the allocation of 
waterways benefits across multiple users. On the one hand, authorities have incorporated 
more responsibilities by internalising new objectives related, for instance, to recreation and 
ecology. This marks a ‘modernisation’ of the settled hierarchy. On the other hand, authorities 
have established novel organisational structures to facilitate better coordination with other 
parties visible in joint contracts. Interestingly, this can be considered a move away from 
hierarchy, using more contractual rather than hierarchical relationships.
Currently, the public actors involved in the Dutch waterway network recognise the urgency to 
upgrade major parts of the inland waterway network (Van der Vlist et al., 2016). Multiple 
assets that were built in the early 20th century (in particular those from the 1920s and 1930s) 
are currently reaching their end-of-life-cycle. These assets include large-scale weirs, bridges, 
and navigation locks which are of national significance and are financed by national public 
funding. In order to integrate a broader set of stakeholder issues, the national government has 
drafted a new ‘Strategic Vision on Renewal & Renovation’ in which three renewal 
approaches are proposed that impact the alignment of interests (figure 1; I&M, 2016). First, 
the “1-to-1 renewal” approach entails the replacement of individual infrastructure assets 
executed one-by-one by the national government, in which the functionality remains 
untouched. The transaction is hierarchically (internally) organised, although local 
governments and waterway users (shippers) are consulted as required by law. Second, the 
“minor renewal” approach involves a change in functionality on the local scale, resulting in 
the involvement of a greater number of local stakeholders. Likewise, transactions with these 
parties may result in covenants in which the national government facilitates additional aims of 
regional and local parties. To illustrate, a municipality can contribute financially to the 
upgrading of a waterworks to include also a recreational bicycle path over the works. Third, 
the “major renewal” approach considers the replacement of specific assets as part of wider 
spatial, regional developments. Transactions, then, operate on a larger geographical scale with 
more distant stakeholders. For example, hydro-energy generated by weirs might be used by 
bordering municipalities that demand novel transactions. These transactions, which involve 
the co-financing of investments, can be captured in public-public partnerships. Altogether, the 
three approaches assign different roles for the strategically-operating Ministry of 
Infrastructure & the Environment, its operator Rijkswaterstaat, and regional and local parties.
8[Insert figure 1]
Figure 1: Three approaches to renewal: (1) 1-to-1 renewal (internal transaction); (2) minor renewal 
(transactions with local stakeholders); and (3) major renewal (transactions with regional stakeholders) (cf. 
I&M, 2016).
3.2. Data collection and analysis
To explore which of the approaches are promising, we approached senior public and private 
officials operating in the inland waterway network and asked them to reflect on the three 
aforementioned renewal approaches. According to McCann et al. (2005), interviews can help 
in creating a first overview of implicit transaction costs, i.e. an overview of renewal 
approaches that interviewees consider either likely or unlikely. A total of 23 in-depth 
interviews were conducted, with interviewees working for, amongst others, the Dutch public 
authority Rijkswaterstaat, the Ministry of Infrastructure & the Environment, regional 
governments, interests groups, and knowledge platforms (see appendix A). The interviews 
aimed to reveal transaction cost-generating and cost-saving factors for the three variables 
interdependency, uncertainty, and timing (table 1). 
The interviews were structured around three topics. First, we asked a number of questions 
focussing on the current institutional setting regarding the inland national waterway network. 
This included dominant actors and involved stakeholders, their goals, and their ways of 
working to achieve these goals. The second part of the interview concentrated on the renewal 
of infrastructure: do stated goals change because of renewal, and consequently will dominant 
ways of working also change? We asked interviewees about potential new stakeholders and 
new structures for working together. Specifically, we asked about risks and triggers for 
establishing new structures, in order to reveal transaction costs. In the third and final part of 
the interview, interviewees were asked to reflect on how the newly mentioned structures 
might be achieved by the sector as a whole. This part of the interview related to adjustments 
needed to start working differently, which could be either easily achievable through simple, 
incremental changes or more difficult, requiring vast institutional investments.
All 23 interviews, which ranged in length from 60 to 90 minutes, were audio-recorded and 
fully transcribed1. The transcripts were systematically coded following a three-step-method:
(i) Coding of the three renewal approaches: 1-to-1 renewal, minor renewal, major 
renewal (figure 1);
(ii) Coding of the transaction dimensions for each approach: asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and timing (table 1);
(iii) Coding of the perceptions of key stakeholders for each approach: Ministry of 
Infrastructure & the Environment, Rijkswaterstaat and regional governments 
(provinces).
1
 Two of the interviews were done by telephone and took only 30 minutes.
9The use of the computer programme Atlas.ti supported the coding process. For example, 
codes for perceptions (step iii) were “responsibilities” (e.g. do interviewees consider the 
investment a shared concern or an internal task?), “finances” (e.g. what are promising 
partnerships or covenants?), and “stance” (e.g. do they mention risks or opportunities?). These 
codes were related to codes of the different parties and the three renewal approaches. As such, 
a matrix was created by which it is possible to identify expert views on potential transaction 
costs for each approach, as well as on the differences in perspectives across stakeholders.
4. Results: identifying transaction costs for renewing waterways
The three approaches as shown in figure 1 will be discussed in sections 4.1-4.3 based on the 
three variables asset specificity, uncertainty and timing (summarised in table 2). Section 4.4 
consists of a discussion of the costs of each approach perceived by the three key stakeholders, 
allowing for a comparison between the three approaches (summarised in table 3).
4.1. 1-to-1 renewal: a technical affair
With 1-to-1 renewal, waterway assets are either replaced or renovated without altering their 
functionality. By doing this, the assumption is that externalities do not have to be addressed, 
as interviewee #19 argued: “If I replace [an asset] 1-to-1, it implies that the [established] 
waterway system configuration will also function for the long term, that it is durable.” This 
perspective follows a sectoral line of reasoning in which transportation and water safety 
purposes are key. To illustrate, interviewee #18 stated: “I consider it [our task] to ensure that 
we protect its inland shipping function”. The current waterways are already designed to 
ensure this, as a Ministry representative (interviewee #4) states: “There have been waterways 
for a long time, the main routes are well-known. (…) Our targets have not changed much 
since 2012 [the launch of the national infrastructure vision], so in that sense [the waterways] 
operate very stably.” This quote illustrates how the current allocation of resources is 
considered adequate, generally speaking.
For the variable asset specificity, it implies that the right of ownership, which is held by the 
Ministry of Infrastructure & the Environment, does not change. The Ministry commissions its 
executive agency Rijkswaterstaat to implement renewal measures to ensure the daily 
operation of the waterway system. Location-specific investments are thus internalised by the 
national government. The (internal) transaction is only complicated by the uncoupling of 
Rijkswaterstaat from the Ministry. On the one hand, Rijkswaterstaat holds detailed system 
knowledge on which the Ministry relies for its decisions. For instance, interviewee #8 states 
that “the technical aspects of the waterways are the expertise and knowhow of 
Rijkswaterstaat.” On the other hand, the Ministry brings in the financial resources without 
which Rijkswaterstaat cannot act. A Ministry representative (interviewee #5) argues that “we 
obviously have a clear role, we also have the large sums of money, that is of course very 
arrogant to say, but [major investments] will not proceed without our involvement.” Other 
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parties (private parties, local and regional governments) have a relatively weak position, as 1-
to-1 renewal typically does not affect established property rights and the existing functionality 
remains intact. Consequently, they only have to be contacted through official consultation 
procedures and no transactions have to be agreed upon. Interviewee #15 working for 
Rijkswaterstaat explains: “that is the more local stakeholder management [in Dutch: 
omgevingsmanagement] in which you only need to consult local parties if we go to work at a 
specific place in the country.”
With regard to uncertainty, the transaction centres on getting the Ministry and Rijkswaterstaat 
on the same page in regard to the sectoral, transportation aims. Rijkswaterstaat is 
commissioned by the Ministry to deliver a technical state of the art of the waterway system 
every two years (RWS, 2017). Subsequently, the Ministry drafts a financial budgeting scheme 
and programme for the list of assets that need to be renewed to secure existing performance 
levels, which is reflected in the national Infrastructure Fund (annual budget for all national 
infrastructure projects) (I&M, 2017). According to interviewee #4, the two parties have 
different interests:
“Of course, Rijkswaterstaat looks after how you would like to have your waterway 
system in the practical operation, that beautiful navigation lock has to live up to all 
requirements, that is their role, fine. But obviously there will not be sufficient financial 
resources to cater for those wishes. We [the Ministry] are always challenging 
Rijkswaterstaat asking, ‘Is that all necessary? Where can we do a bit more, and where 
a bit less?’.”
To that purpose, mainly technical and financial information is transferred. This hints upon a 
national government which does not fear adverse selection, as it expects that other parties will 
not be harmed.
The timing of the transaction is seen in a longstanding relation between the Ministry and 
Rijkswaterstaat, in which both parties frequently meet. The client-contractor relationship has 
become formalised and institutionalised, with both sides familiar with each other’s 
responsibilities. To illustrate, interviewee #4 describes how the formation of Rijkswaterstaat 
as an executive agency in 2004 has resulted in a “professionalisation” of each other’s 
positions, in which responsibilities are harnessed and formalised in an administrative 
structure. This is far from political. Instead, it is more a bureaucratic, internal game to acquire 
the right funds for each asset to maintain current performance levels of the waterway network. 
As a result, the 1-to-1 renewal approach is an organisational form that is closely related to a 
hierarchy, in which the Ministry and Rijkswaterstaat have internalised their (sectoral) 
activities (figure 2; table 2).
[Insert figure 2]
Figure 2: Inter-organisational structures of: (1) 1-to-1 renewal (hierarchical relationships); (2) minor 
renewal (hierarchical relationships); and (3) major renewal (contractual relationships).
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4.2. Minor renewal: local stakeholder involvement
Interviewees describe how, over time, they became aware of the limitations of the 1-to-1 
renewal approach and the loss of mutual gains when this approach was continued. For 
instance, Rijkswaterstaat interviewee #14 states that “there is a growing awareness that 
opportunities exist. Synergies. There might be regional problems for which we can create 
shared solutions.” Likewise, the Ministry sees a potential for this: “We want to trigger 
[Rijkswaterstaat] to look at their surroundings. Which developments do they observe when 
they look once more at their surroundings, or the waterway corridor? Is it possible to 
combine certain things?” (interviewee #4). In addition to the sectoral aims of transportation 
and water safety, a new approach was developed that also more explicitly regards the 
integration of additional aims from neighbouring land owners. As a consequence, the 
externalities can be addressed through new transactions that incorporate additional 
functionalities. This approach is called minor renewal, in which the local context of the 
waterway asset is taken into perspective (figure 1).
At first sight, the asset specificity seems to increase, because more parties, such as regional 
and local stakeholders, make location-specific investments. For minor renewal, the Ministry 
obliges Rijkswaterstaat to deliver, complementary to a technical overview of waterway assets, 
a “regional consultation” (regio-advies) for each asset that needs to be renewed. Interviewee 
#21 explains:
“The regional consultation is meant not only to approach renewal from a budgeting 
and technical viewpoint, but also already in the earlier phases to look around, how 
does the asset relate to its surroundings? (…) Then its focus shifts to the engineering, 
the concrete and such, as well as to the consultation for programming and planning 
the asset integrated in its surroundings.”
Thus, concerning uncertainty, information on future waterway conditions becomes not only 
technical, but also functional (i.e. discussing other functions than solely transportation), as 
interviewee #15 explains further:
“The word ‘region’ was coined because it was seen as a sort of counterpart of the 
national technical overview. So the consultation ensures that for each region the 
operator Rijkswaterstaat starts in time to investigate more broadly with other parties 
in the area to explore the best synergies.”
This consultation moves beyond the common consultation, as more in-depth explorations with 
regional parties are started. Because of this growing information acquisition, it can be 
expected that adverse selection and moral hazards are likely to diminish compared to the 1-to-
1 renewal approach. However, wider consultation is not necessarily required. The regional 
consultation obliges Rijkswaterstaat to inventory regional developments and identify potential 
synergies, in order to “look past the blinkers” (interviewee #16), but are not pushed to 
establish new transactions. Regional parties, thus, do not directly gain in importance, as 
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Rijkswaterstaat executes the exploration mainly by itself. The property rights and ownership 
of financial resources remain within the Ministry, just as the technical knowledge remains in 
the Rijkswaterstaat domain. The “minor renewal”-approach remains mainly a bilateral affair 
between the Ministry and Rijkswaterstaat. Inter-organisational structures in which, for 
example, regional governments co-finance integrated renewal projects are not considered. A 
Rijkswaterstaat interviewee #18 argues that often, regional developments have “no 
infrastructural effects, at least not on the waterways”. Similarly, interviewee #16 states that 
“for the – say – seventy potential renewal projects, of which eventually twenty will proceed, 
perhaps only three will really need such regional consultation.” This quote illustrates the 
limited advantages that Rijkswaterstaat interviewees in particular observe in incorporating 
also regional concerns. The timing of transactions, therefore, also remains largely the same. 
The Ministry-Rijkswaterstaat relationship is mainly deepened with the complementation of 
functional discussions. In sum, transactions remain an internal affair for the Ministry and 
Rijkswaterstaat, without much involvement of other parties (figure 2).
It must be noted that Rijkswaterstaat interviewees also argue that they do not have the 
mandate to start extensive consultation rounds with regional stakeholders, so they want to 
prevent high expectations. For example, interviewee #15 states:
“Formally, we need to have an order from the Ministry to start those sort of things. As 
Rijkswaterstaat, we cannot act independently. Look, we can independently contact 
regional stakeholders to ask, ‘what is your view on this?’. But as soon as we say, ‘we are 
thinking of renewing this particular navigation lock and what do you think of it?’, then it 
becomes complicated.”
The Ministry confirms that procedures for integrating broader regional developments in 
renewal procedures are still being tried out and developed. Interviewee #4 elaborates: “There 
is a choice between two forms. Either you give a formal assignment with strict priorities to 
Rijkswaterstaat, or you continue with how we currently work, but you trigger 
[Rijkswaterstaat] to incorporate broader developments in another way.” To conclude, the 
organisational form of minor renewal resembles the original hierarchy between Ministry and 
Rijkswaterstaat, in which the introduced regional consultation remains mainly an 
administrative feature which leaves property rights largely untouched (table 2). However, the 
interviewees indicate that the broader perspective deepens the information impactedness, seen 
in a growing interest in regional developments (dotted line, figure 2). To date, the national 
government tries to facilitate regional and local developments, but this does not accumulate 
into new transactions such as national-local partnerships.
4.3. Major renewal: upgrading complete areas all at once
The main reason why interviewees are hesitant to allocate more legal power to the regional 
consultation is that it comes close to the already legally established national programming, 
planning and budgeting (PPB) framework of key Dutch national infrastructure projects. This 
Multi-year Programme for Infrastructure, Land Use and Transport (in Dutch: 
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Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport; abbreviated to MIRT) has 
developed an extensive set of guidelines – “the MIRT-framework” – which help public 
governments to find common ground regarding infrastructure investments and, subsequently, 
develop shared partnerships and covenants per region, eventually leading to “MIRT-projects” 
(see Arts et al., 2016). According to interviewee #15, renewal projects can adhere to this 
framework “once they are outside the domain of existing infrastructure”, for instance because 
of expansion or a functional change. Renewal approaches in which the PPB-framework is 
used can be considered major renewal, as in this approach waterway renewal is perceived as 
an opportunity to upgrade complete corridors and/or areas in which national and regional 
parties collaborate (figure 1). As such, internalising externalities becomes an explicit aim.
The major renewal approach is associated with a different asset specificity. Instead of strictly 
divided location-specific investments, the major renewal approach produces location-specific 
investments that are shared between public governments (national Ministry and regional 
provinces) (figure 2). Consequently, sectoral aims are turned into more integrative, 
comprehensive aims. Interviewees from the provinces in particular argue in favour of the 
national programming, planning, budgeting framework. To illustrate, interviewee #7 states 
that renewal projects should always be executed using this framework to explicitly look for 
synergies with regional developments. In this setting, the technical system knowledge held by 
Rijkswaterstaat is complemented by expertise on regional development held especially by the 
province, which is backed by regional coalitions of enterprises, citizens and local NGOs. 
Furthermore, financial resources are not held solely by the Ministry, but supplemented by 
provinces and municipalities. For example, interviewee #8, who works for a province, argues 
that “if you have certain [regional] ambitions, then you also have to take responsibility – also 
in financial terms.” Altogether, the bilateral dependence increases, as functional knowledge 
of the waterway and surrounding land and the financial resources are better spread out among 
parties. As a result, transactions become more contractual and hazardous (figure 2).
In this approach, the uncertainty on future waterway conditions is quite high, as theoretically 
all sorts of objectives can be combined. To this end, the PPB-framework is an institutional 
arrangement that caters for biannual meetings between politicians of national and regional 
parties (Bestuurlijk Overleg MIRT) in which shared ambitions can be discussed. This prevents 
pure market-based relationships which are associated with high risks of adverse selection and 
moral hazards. In this framework, especially regional governments that present themselves as 
representatives of the region gain in power. For example, regional governments in the 
Amsterdam area have pushed the national government for the renewal and enlargement of the 
Sea Lock IJmuiden that links the port of Amsterdam to the world. A partnership between the 
national government, the province of North-Holland and the municipality of Amsterdam, 
leading to bilateral dependencies, resulted in a €3 billion project budget, to which the 
province and municipality contributed together roughly 33%. Interviewee #5 confirms:
“Provinces have become full-fledged stakeholders, because of the decentralisation [of 
spatial policies in the Netherlands since 2010]. (…) This implies that they think along 
and contribute financial resources if they want something. I observe that some 
provinces deal very well with that, compared to others.”
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In contrast, Rijkswaterstaat loses power when compared to the other renewal approaches, as 
their technical expertise is no longer the central concern. Still, their technical expertise 
remains a trigger to start major renewal at all, so in that regard other parties still rely on 
Rijkswaterstaat. Interviewee #13 confirms: “We are the technical expert, but we are not 
independent.” Indeed, an operator’s interests are different from those of a regional 
government.
When using this approach, the timing changes significantly. The formation of partnerships 
between public governments leads to more, and more equal, contacts. Instead of consultation, 
regional parties now voluntarily co-operate with the national government. The duration and 
frequency of this interaction is established within the national programming, planning and 
budgeting framework. This framework involves for instance strategic-regional advisory 
groups in which public governments participate and that accumulate into explorations for 
specific infrastructure projects. In sum, the major renewal approach can be considered more 
of a contractual relationship between public bodies, moving away from the hierarchical 
organisational form (table 2).
1-to-1 renewal Minor renewal Major renewal
Asset specificity - Ministry has full control 
and financial resources, 
commissions its tasks to 
Rijkswaterstaat;
- Rijkswaterstaat owns 
detailed technical system 
knowledge;
- Other parties are heard 
through local and regional 
consultation.
- Ministry has full control 
and financial resources, 
commissions its tasks to 
Rijkswaterstaat;
- Rijkswaterstaat owns 
detailed technical system 
knowledge;
- Other parties are heard 
through more extensive 
local and regional 
consultation.
- Ministry and regional 
governments share right of 
ownership and financial 
resources, visible in 
contractual agreements 
(partnering) at particular 
locations;
- Knowledge: functional 
(provinces, Ministry) and 
technical (RWS).
Uncertainty - Technically-oriented, 
driven by engineers;








(without legal status): 
mainly mapping the 
interests, not partnering.
High information level 
because of extensive 
discussions related to 
regional development, 
functionality of the 
waterway system.
Timing - Formalised and 
hierarchical relationships 
between Ministry and 
Rijkswaterstaat;
- Short and limited 
consultation with other 
parties.
- Formalised and 
hierarchical relationships 
between Ministry and 
Rijkswaterstaat;
- Short and limited 
consultation with other 
parties.
- Specific moments in time 
to discuss each other’s 
interests, based on the 
MIRT-framework;
- Outcome is the 
establishment of 
partnerships.
Table 2: Three approaches to renewal.
4.4. Comparing the transaction costs of the three approaches
15
This section discusses the transaction costs that interviewees relate to each of the three 
approaches, reasoned from the point of view of three key stakeholders: the strategically 
operating Ministry, its executive branch Rijkswaterstaat, and regional governments 
represented by the provinces (summarised in table 3 at the end of this section).
In the 1-to-1 renewal approach, the hierarchical relationships between the Ministry and 
Rijkswaterstaat result in “neat” transaction costs according to interviewees working for these 
two organisations. They argue that both parties have clear responsibilities and mandates, 
leading to efficient institutional arrangements. The interdependence is internalised, with the 
Ministry taking care of policy-making and budgeting and Rijkswaterstaat of the day-to-day-
operation. Because of these responsibilities, the Ministry is the party that holds the financial 
resources and Rijkswaterstaat the party with the technical expertise of the waterway system. 
There is limited uncertainty as these asymmetries are overcome through fixed procedures and 
task divisions. Also, there are clear moments in time for interaction: internally in the division 
between the Ministry and Rijkswaterstaat and externally with other parties through 
consultation procedures.
Interviewees from all three groups give warning that the central potential transaction cost-
generating factor is other parties’ ignorance in this hierarchical, sectoral approach. In the 1-to-
1 renewal approach, the Ministry and Rijkswaterstaat operate as a silo-based entity with 
limited interactions with others. According to Rijkswaterstaat interviewees, their physical 
interventions in the waterway do not alter its functionality and, hence, other waterway users 
or surrounding land owners will not be harmed. As such, they perceive no need to invest in 
gaining knowledge of other parties’ perspectives. However, this can lead to a higher 
uncertainty (information asymmetries) which might generate transaction costs. The warning is 
not only uttered by the Ministry and the province (see 4.2); some Rijkswaterstaat interviewees 
also acknowledge the need to look broader to align interests with other parties. To illustrate, 
interviewee #17 states: “The interdependencies are just a matter of fact, as a result of how 
multiple functions and areas are interwoven. […] We cannot broaden a canal without talking 
to the municipality. That is not an option.” This quote demonstrates how Rijkswaterstaat 
interviewees often take an instrumental viewpoint on collaboration, as a means to replace 
waterway assets efficiently. Discussing the current externalities is considered irrelevant. Yet, 
because they are not addressed, regional parties might object to proposals, because these 
proposals do not incorporate their objectives. Provinces argue that it can also benefit both 
parties. An example is given by interviewee #7:
“If we have to renew that weir, maybe we can create more integrative developments, 
like with a small marina or by building a hotel, in order to try and create more than 
just that sterile weir. It is also an opportunity to generate money in different ways.”
The minor renewal approach aims to overcome the sectoral angle by complementing the 
technical expertise of Rijkswaterstaat with a more functional overview of regional 
developments. The tool for this – the “regional consultation” implemented by Rijkswaterstaat 
– is new and still open to debate. Rijkswaterstaat interviewee #15 explains: “We currently 
have not explicitly decided to actively approach and visit all sorts of stakeholders to ask what 
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they think about it. But we have also not decided not to do so.” The Ministry, too, argues this 
tool is new to them: “It still is new ground for us. I like to join a lot of discussions, but we 
hope Rijkswaterstaat knows what we think so we can leave it there.” (#4) The provinces have 
not yet heard of the “regional consultation”, but argue that such a tool can be easily linked to 
existing regional organisational structures. For instance, interviewee #9 argues: “Within the 
province, we have ‘regional tables’ where these kind of wishes can be inventoried, and where 
the likely development of a region can be discussed, not only infrastructure-wise.”
As a consequence, so far, it is mainly Rijkswaterstaat that has to make more transaction costs 
by investing more in its regional partners. However, it does so mainly by solely inventorying 
regional developments through scanning regional plans and visions. Accordingly, the 
interdependence between parties remains largely the same (compare figure 2). The investment 
by Rijkswaterstaat is a transaction cost-saving factor for uncertainty, which will decrease to 
some degree as more functionally-related information is analysed, although this does not 
imply that new actions follow out of this. As also stated in section 4.2, there are only a small 
number of waterway assets that Rijkswaterstaat interviewees consider suitable for regional 
consultation.
The major renewal approach is based on contractual relationships between public 
governments, in which they voluntarily search for infrastructure investments that benefit all 
sides. Especially functions that relate to transportation aims are considered promising, such as 
commercial development along the waterways. Regional coalitions often identify a potential 
for stimulating regional economic development by upgrading waterways. To illustrate; “We 
are located next to an international corridor, so how can we generate more economic growth 
to profit maximally from this together with our logistic partners?” (interviewee #11). In that 
case, interviewees frequently point to the objective to achieve a modal shift from the road to 
waterway network: “Companies like Samsung, Fuiji, Dell, Tesla, they have located 
themselves [in Noord-Brabant] partly because of the multimodal accessibility.” (interviewee 
#8) Interviewees mention promising projects such as a widening of canals and allowing for 
new container terminals and related business sites close to the waterway. In regions where the 
national government perceives a reduction in future waterway use, provinces usually step in 
to keep waterways at existing performance levels for shipping. The province of Overijssel, for 
instance, has contributed € 1 million (50%) to the national government to ensure a 24/7 
operation of navigation locks in the Twente Canal. The transportation interests resonate 
strongly with the initial aims of the waterway network, i.e. to bring prosperity by allowing 
transportation between towns in the Netherlands.
In addition to transportation aims, interviewees mention three clusters of aims that can be 
incorporated. First, environmental concerns have resulted in a focus on, for example, water 
quality issues (e.g., addressing salinization) and more eco-friendly canals (e.g., more natural 
river banks). Second, interviewees argue for making assets more sustainable in terms of 
construction materials. Also, assets could be used to generate renewable energy, for instance 
hydro-energy in weirs. Interviewee #18 explains that Rijkswaterstaat has “the ambition to 
make all infrastructure assets energy neutral by 2020.” Third, a reduced interest is put on 
connecting waterway assets with other types of users than just transporters, such as local 
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residents and tourists. In this perspective, assets can be perceived as heritage to not only 
attract tourists, but also to create a sense of belonging for local residents. These three groups 
of functions have been explored less, and seem to occur in a more ad-hoc fashion.
From a transaction-cost perspective, once more integrative aims are being looked for, 
interviewees argue that there is significant potential for saving transaction costs with major 
renewal as resources are better allocated. Successful examples can be derived from public-
public partnerships in the adjacent fields of water management 
(Hoogwaterbeschermingsprogramma, Ruimte voor de Rivier, Deltaprogramma) and 
highways (MIRT-projects such as the A2 Maastricht), in which national transportation aims 
are combined with regional spatial developments. The contractual relationships in these 
partnerships monetise the value parties are willing to contribute, leading to an improved 
allocation of resources. The provinces and the Ministry in particular see the potential for such 
agreements. These partnerships are also said to legitimise budget allocations better, as more 
societal value is created out of initially “plain” renewal budgets. According to Rijkswaterstaat 
interviewee #13:
“You explore how the waterway configuration of [for example] the Meuse river will 
look live in hundred years. […] That is a principal decision that is only dealt with by a 
limited number of experts. I thought by myself that ‘this simply cannot be true’.”
The Ministry also argues that more integrative perspectives are needed: “It is very simple. I 
will not assign money for pure replacement [1-to-1 renewal]. Period. And as long as I do not 
commission Rijkswaterstaat, they will not receive any money.” (interviewee #5) Parties, thus, 
have to start investing in each other up front, in order to familiarise themselves with each 
other’s interests. Accordingly, lower dispute costs can be expected. 
At the same time, interviewees associate the major renewal approach with high transaction 
costs, because of extensive negotiations and alignment of interests. For instance, interviewee 
#12 states that “for renewal, [the PPB-framework] is a heavy tool.” It calls for longer time 
horizons in which parties co-operate and for more frequent gatherings between public 
governments. Rijkswaterstaat interviewees in particular caution to “keep a firm footing” 
(#16) in order to remain in control of waterway developments. This is driven by the 
responsibility of the implementer Rijkswaterstaat, in charge of the operation of the waterway 
network. Interviewee #18 warns that Rijkswaterstaat “has to protect what is in place [i.e. the 
transportation function].” The limited use of the major renewal approach in current practice 
seems to indicate that the cost-generating factors are perceived as higher than the cost-saving 
factors. Interviewees state that this approach brings in many risks to successfully get to an 
agreement to the mutual benefit of all parties and that benefits often remain intangible.
Comparing the three renewal approaches, we observe that transaction costs arise in each 
approach, but at different stages. Interviewees reason that the potential transaction costs in 
later stages in the 1-to-1 renewal approach are prevented in the major renewal approach, yet 
this approach comes with higher upfront costs. According to interviewee #17, these higher 
costs are legitimised because “we [Rijkswaterstaat] cannot [replace assets] by ourselves, 
since waterways touch upon too many issues. It is a pure necessity to be more collaborative.” 
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From this angle, wider stakeholder involvement is a means to protect the agency’s own 
mission, as societal resistance can occur later on when infrastructure projects are planned and 
constructed. An economic driver exists for choosing the major renewal approach: it may 
lower transaction costs overall.
Nevertheless, an in-depth reconsideration of current externalities in the major renewal 
approach is only attempted once functional modifications do not harm the primary functions 
of the waterway network. This does imply a move away from responsibilities by the executive 
agency Rijkswaterstaat (cf. figure 2). Since this approach is not yet seen in practice, our 
findings point towards an already sufficient allocation of resources and use. They also 
reconfirm the vested interests of dominant actors, echoing the concept of path dependency 
(Notteboom et al., 2013). From the perspective of the operator, the contractual relationships 
proposed in the major renewal approach are considered as requiring too many uncertain 
investments. Altogether, new transactions mainly seem to reconfirm existing transactions. 
This suggests that current waterway configurations are not questioned, but rather taken for 
granted. This indicates an approach for renewal that favours established institutional 
structures and waterway configurations.
1-to-1 renewal Minor renewal Major renewal
Ministry Simple and comprehensible, 
but awareness of potentially 
missing out of opportunities.
Allocating responsibilities to 
Rijkswaterstaat; it knows our 
interests and ambitions, so we 
can leave it to them.
Promising and in line with 
new strategies and structures 





oriented, feeling of being in 
charge.
Additional work with 
‘regional consultation’ with 
unknown added value, and 
risk of increasing 
expectations.
Risky and uncertain inter-
organisational structure;





Missing out of opportunities 
leading to objections; not 
looking for mutual benefits.
Minor renewal can easily be 
combined with existing 
regional collaborative 
structures that explore 
synergies.
Advantageous, because of 
becoming a more equal 
partner to the national 
government as a result of 
which mutual benefits can be 
jointly explored.
Table 3: Stances of the three key actors on renewal.
5. Conclusions
Modern waterways in the western world face a major challenge: the renewal of these mature 
infrastructure networks in order to meet current and future demands. Renewing assets can be 
considered an impetus to re-align and integrate the different functions that waterways can 
serve. To achieve this, different inter-organisational structures can be established that address 
the geographical implications of various waterway infrastructure choices differently. The aim 
of this article was to explore the transaction costs key actors associate with different 
approaches that address waterway renewal and the implications for waterway planning 
practice. We studied this specifically in the national inland waterway network of the 
Netherlands in which national infrastructure investments are predominantly a public concern.
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Our empirical results demonstrate that waterway renewal is mainly approached as a 
possibility for incorporating additional functionalities in terms of capacity (expansion or 
reduction), but not so much in terms of quality (including functional-spatial objectives). As a 
result, renewal investments remain close to the initial transportation aims of the waterways 
and only limitedly account for the geographical implications and the involvement of other 
stakeholders. Although the actual transactions may be different in practice, interviewees 
perceive broader stakeholder involvement to imply uncertain and time-consuming 
transactions. Moreover, the asset specificity is expected to move from a ‘comfortable’ 
sectoral-driven hierarchy towards contractual relationships that aim to integrate different 
stakeholders and functions. Because investments at waterway locations become shared, 
dominant actors in the waterways argue that they have much to lose, and only little to win 
(table 3): interviewees perceive a negative trade-off between the additional transaction costs 
for broader stakeholder involvement, proposed in the major renewal approach in our case 
study, and the suggested benefits. This suggests that dominant actors perceive high 
institutional impediments to switch to other waterway configurations (cf. Notteboom et al., 
2013). Path dependencies may thus result in “satisficing” actors that espouse to a bounded 
vision that subjectively may look efficient, but objectively may be far from it (Moe, 1984: 
747). Actors do often not account for societal benefits, but rather optimise their own 
mandates. Ultimately, this results in waterway renewal investments that do not aim at 
internalise externalities, but rather leave them untouched. The dominance of the 1-to-1 
renewal approach in our case study is a striking example, which was seen by interviewees as 
comprehensible and relatively straightforward.
Yet, our findings show how interviewees also consider the pitfalls of this approach. On the 
one hand, they are concerned about transaction costs appearing at a later stage due to legal 
disputes that might arise from not incorporating neighbouring waterway functions and 
demands. On the other hand, they see the potential for creating more societal benefits by 
combining different aims. Regional governments in our case study in particular stated the 
promise of more integrative approaches, in which their role will increase in importance. This 
approach does, however, require large upfront investments because of extensive negotiating 
and aligning interests, which indicates that emerging transaction costs in the later stages seem 
to be more accepted than those in the early stages (cf. McCann et al., 2005). Put differently, 
short-term objectives overrule longer-term objectives which withholds strategic 
considerations required for considering new waterway configurations. There are two reasons 
for this bounded perspective. First, regardless of the functional interrelatedness, we observed 
fragmentation among stakeholders, which makes parties unfamiliar with exploring new 
functions and the according required organisational structures. In our case study, we observe 
that active regional coalitions operate as a stimulus for the dominant national government to 
explore novel institutional arrangements. Second, organisational interests often prevail over 
societal ones: it is easier to stay within given mandates and administrative boundaries (cf. Lai, 
2007). The focus is put on specific waterway assets, ignoring wider geographical and time 
scales in order to prevent shared location-specific investments and dependencies. Altogether, 
these findings suggest an institutional inertia that remains close to the current division of 
functions around the waterways.
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Once the perceptions on efficient inter-organisational structures had been identified (table 2), 
our transaction-cost perspective reveals two major implications for transportation planning. 
First, dominant actors (the national government) are advised to invest in new inter-
organisational structures which they currently consider as uncertain and risky. In that sense, 
these parties have to step out of their comfort zone, turning hierarchical relationships into 
more contractual ones that cater for the co-creation of societal value through integrative 
waterway planning approaches. This move implies a step away from the sectoral, asset-
centred perspective. Second, other parties (regional governments and private parties such as 
energy companies) that gain in importance are suggested to take up parts of these newly 
created transaction costs, not only in financial terms but also in terms of human capital and 
expertise. This will result in a better distribution of responsibilities, costs and risks that may 
overcome the barriers that currently obstruct broader stakeholder involvement.
Our research has shown the institutional barriers of realising broad stakeholder involvement 
from the theoretical angle of transaction cost economics. Internalising externalities of 
infrastructure investments, as part of more integrative forms of waterway planning, will grow 
in importance, because of ongoing changing land-uses (e.g. urbanisation, climate change). As 
our study is a first exploration, future research can focus on a quantification of the transaction 
costs to substantiate these claims more, and, on a comparison of perceived costs with actual 
costs. Following Buitelaar (2004), we are aware that the transaction costs are just one out of 
many criteria for assessing infrastructure investments, albeit a critical one. Based on our 
research, we identify two other relevant research avenues. On the one hand, future research 
can explore the social benefits rather than the costs of more integrative approaches, because 
these emerging approaches suggest the seizing of opportunities by combining national and 
regional aims. On the other hand, integrative renewal approaches can also be examined from a 
legitimation point of view, which is an important criterion for public bureaucracies (Moe, 
1984). Future research can take up to what extent the growth in integrative renewal 
approaches can be explained by motives of regaining public authority.
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